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individuals, not states. 1 3 It is enacted under federal law, carries a federal tax penalty for non-compliance, and will be enforced by federal authorities. 14 States have offered various theories of standing to challenge the individual mandate, but the Court likely will not have to resolve that question. 15 As long as one individual plaintiff or the association representing individuals in the Florida case retains standing, the question of the constitutionality of the individual mandate is properly before the Court. 16 Lower courts' decisions in the ACA litigation, however, leave the standing paradox unresolved. At least one court wrote strongly that a state, suing alone, may not challenge the individual mandate. 7 That decision may be the product of strategic error by the plaintiff-state or the court's restrictive application of standing doctrine. By contrast, lower court decisions, described in detail below, liberally allowed individuals to challenge the individual mandate's constitutionality-not as a violation of their own individual rights but as an intrusion on states' reserved powers-as long as the plaintiffs alleged concrete, particularized injury.'8 After cataloguing courts' treatment of individual plaintiffs' standing claims, this Article contends that courts should similarly allow states to challenge the scope of federal power, as long as states meet the same constitutional requirements for standing.
B. STANDING DOCTRINE
The essential contours of federal standing law are well established and not at issue in the ACA litigation. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal judicial power to the adjudication of cases or controversies. 19 The case-or-controversy requirement means that the plaintiff must have standing to bring a challenge. 2 ' The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" consists of three elements: 13 One statutory role for states with respect to the individual mandate is tied to health insurance exchanges, which are required to certify individuals as exempt from the individual mandate. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(d)(4), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Accordingly, if states elect to operate their own exchanges, rather than leaving that task to the federal government, they would be required to perform that certification function.
14 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (West 2012) (providing federal income tax penalty); id. § 5000A(g) (specifying federal enforcement). "the question of the state plaintiffs' standing to challenge the individual mandate is an interesting and difficult one, in the posture of this case, it is purely academic and one we need not confront today"). 16 Id. (noting that " [t] he law is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim-as is the case here-we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing" and citing cases); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (noting that only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit the Court to consider the petition for review). A plaintiff may allege either actual present injury or imminent future injury. 22 With respect to associations, the Supreme Court held that an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
23
The Court has interpreted the "concrete and particularized" injury requirement to mean that generalized grievances about the government, "claiming only harm to [the plaintiffs] and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws," do not support Article III standing. 24 "While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way., 25 The fact that an injury may be widely shared, or that a political forum may also be available to raise the issue, does not lessen the injury or necessarily deprive the court ofjurisdiction 2 6
The constitutional requirements for standing "preserve[] the vitality of the adversarial process" by assuring that the parties before the Court have a real stake in the outcome and that the issues will be resolved "not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete, factual context." 2 7 "More important, the law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers., 2 8 The separation of powers doctrine limits the role of courts, committing certain subject matter to Congress and the political process. 29 30 Justiciability limits, including standing, also "empower the executive branch to promote its policies, constrained by political, rather than judicial limits." 31 By channeling only disputes that satisfy the constitutional minimum requirements, the standing doctrine respects "the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society., 32 
II. INDIVIDUAL AND STATE CHALLENGES TO THE ACA
In the ACA litigation, both states and individuals are suing the federal government or representatives in their official capacity, challenging the constitutionality of ACA. Typically, constitutional litigation involves individuals or private entities suing government defendants. Until relatively recently, states rarely sued the federal government to vindicate their own or their citizens' rights. 33 Conflicts over the relative power of states and the federal government were resolved through the political, not judicial, process.
34 These structural issues might end up in court if individuals seek to defend themselves from federal enforcement actions by challenging the applicable law as exceeding Congress's enumerated powers. 35 In the ACA litigation, the individual claims arise in just that posture. States also challenge certain ACA provisions, however, defending the contours of state power under the Constitution and, perhaps derivatively, the rights of individual state inhabitants.
dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.").
30 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 233 (1988) . 31 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (noting that separation of powers principle "counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. . . . ' We could not recognize respondents' standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle.") (internal citation omitted); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 985 (citing sources Private parties suing over the ACA include individuals, subject to the minimum essential coverage requirement, 36 or employers, subject to the employer responsibility provisions. 37 In both cases, the plaintiffs challenge the federal government's enforcement of tax penalties on them for failing to comply with the applicable provisions. Lacking cognizable due process, equal protection, or other individual right claims, 38 the lawsuits assert that the ACA is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power and, therefore, the Act, or at least the challenged provisions, cannot be applied against them. To be sure, there are plausible individual rights objections to the requirement to purchase health insurance, including interference with autonomous healthcare decision-making and freedom of contract. At the core, the objections sound in libertarian rights and economic liberty to be free from government coercion. Opponents contend that the federal government cannot require individuals to purchase a good or service from another private individual or company. Arguments asserting rights to bodily autonomy or freedom to make healthcare decisions are unavailing because the mandate does not require individuals to receive any particular medical treatment, or, indeed, any treatment at all. Nor does it require individuals to seek medical care under the health insurance policies that they purchase; it merely requires the purchase of health insurance. Individual rights claims, while politically salient and arguably sympathetic, likely would not support the plaintiffs' arguments to strike down the individual mandate as unconstitutional. In the Court's post-Lochner era, 40 57 By contrast, a substantive due process, individual rights challenge would at least allow Congress to justify its reasons for infringing on otherwise constitutionally protected rights. In effect, individuals would become independent citizen-enforcers of structural limits of the Constitution, overriding legislative policy judgments. Accepting that individuals may bring political objections to the courts in that posture, it is hard to see sound reasons for denying states the same opportunity.
B. STATES LITIGATING INDIVIDUALS' INTERESTS
Under ACA, the easy question is states' standing to challenge Medicaid expansion because those new federal requirements operate directly on states. 58 The hard question is states' standing to challenge the individual mandate, which, by its terms, does not operate on states, but rather on state inhabitants.
5 9 The law is well settled that states cannot sue merely as nominal plaintiffs, asserting the rights of their citizens against enforcement of federal laws. But when states claim concrete, particularized injuries to their own rights and interests, courts should recognize state standing. Moreover, there seems to be no harm in further allowing states that have satisfied the constitutional minimum for standing also to litigate their citizens' interests in maintaining limits on federal power.
Under the established Mellon doctrine, states cannot maintain suits merely as representatives of citizens to protect them against unconstitutional congressional acts. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Maternity Leave Act, which appropriated federal funds for maternal and child health and gave states the option of cooperating with the federal government's efforts.
6 1 Massachusetts had not yet opted into the program but alleged that the federal law invaded its "rights and powers as a sovereign state and the rights of its citizens.", 62 Rejecting the Commonwealth's assertion of standing, the Court first noted that the Maternity Leave Act did not invade state powers because the Constitution does not obligate states to assist the federal government. 63 The only other burden that the Commonwealth could assert was taxation, which fell upon state inhabitants, not the state itself 64 The Court concluded that the Commonwealth could not maintain a suit as a representative of its citizens, noting that states have no "duty or power to enforce their [citizens'] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United " Id. at 1739-40, 1746 (observing that some collective action problems, such as the difficulty individuals with pre-existing conditions face obtaining insurance, may call for a national solution and that striking down the individual mandate on structural grounds would prevent Congress from addressing those problems, even if states are simply unable). But see Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591, 607-09 (2011) (suggesting that congressional exercise of commerce power to mandate purchase of health insurance could be justified as a collective action problem).
" See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2012) (listing requirements for state plans to receive federal matching dollars, expanding Medicaid eligibility).
'9 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)-(b) (West 2012) (mandating that "an applicable individual" maintain minimum essential coverage" and providing penalties for noncompliance). The Court, however, has recognized state standing when proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests are at stake. 67 First, states may maintain standing to redress injury to their own proprietary interests, such as owning land, streams, and highways, or engaging in business ventures like private proprietors. 68 Second, states have standing to litigate questions of sovereignty, such as border disputes. 69 More difficult sovereign standing questions arise over states' governing interests, that is, the exercise of sovereign power "to create and enforce a legal code.", 70 If a state claims that its own rights, not merely its citizens' rights, are implicated, the Court may recognize standing. For example, states are allowed to challenge federal laws that purport to apply directly to state governments, 7 ' like Medicaid, 72 or interfere with recognized state regulatory power, such as voting requirements. 7' In challenging the Federal Voting Rights Act, a state could not, however, assert due process, bill of attainder, or separation of powers arguments, as those rights belonged to citizens, not the states. 74 The state interest in voting derived from the Constitution's recognition of general state control of election qualifications.
75
The third category of state standing cases, dubbed "quasi-sovereign interests," involves "interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace. 76 The state interest, however, must still be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy with the defendant.
77 "[T]he State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties-that is, the State must be more than a nominal party. ' 78 Applying those principles, the Court in Alfred L. Snapp Five lower court decisions recognized individual plaintiffs' standing to challenge the individual mandate as long as the plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating present-day injury-in-fact resulting from the future effective date of the mandate. Courts generally rejected as too speculative defendants' suggestions that some or all plaintiffs might have changed circumstances and, thus, would not necessarily be subject to the individual mandate and its penalty for non-compliance. One large employer plaintiff had standing to challenge the employer penalty for failing to offer health insurance plans to employees, based on allegations that it, like the individual plaintiffs, was forced to change its current business and financial practices to prepare for the 2014 effective date of the ACA's employer responsibility provisions.
One circuit court also recognized, at least in theory, state standing to challenge the individual mandate, although that conclusion was not necessary because individual plaintiffs involved in the same suit also had standing. According to another court, public officials did not have standing based on their official status and political objections to ACA or federal health reform policy. 0 3 Judge Vinson's ruling was based on the individuals' declarations that the mandate, although not in effect until 2014, required them presently to investigate the impact that compliance with the individual mandate would have on their personal and business finances. 104 Mary Brown, a small business owner and member of the association plaintiff NFIB, asserted that requiring her to purchase health insurance, which she neither wanted nor needed, threatened her ability to operate her business.' 0 5 Kaj Ahlburg, an unemployed retiree who was too young to qualify for On the question of states' standing, Judge Vinson noted that at least two of the plaintiff-states, Idaho and Utah, had passed legislation protecting their citizens from any requirement to purchase health insurance. Judge Vinson held that those two states had adequate standing based on the existence of a validly enacted state law, which triggered the duty of the states' attorneys general "to defend the law and the associated sovereign power to enact it."' 0 9 As long as some of the plaintiff-states had standing, there was no need to consider the remaining states' assertions of standing to challenge the individual mandate."1 0
The Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the district court's standing analysis, first noting that the federal government did not contest the standing of the individual plaintiffs or NFIB, nor the states' interests in challenging the Medicaid expansion.
1
The only remaining question was whether the states had standing to challenge the individual mandate.' 1 2 The states firmly rejected the suggestion that their standing was based on parens partriae, as representatives of their citizens." 3 Instead, they asserted standing to challenge the individual mandate on three grounds: first, the individual mandate would necessarily increase Medicaid enrollment, thereby burdening states; second, if any unconstitutional provisions of the ACA were not severable, states' clear standing to challenge Medicaid expansion would also give them standing to challenge the individual mandate; and, third, the federal mandate infringed on state sovereignty to enforce state laws, such as Utah's, Idaho's, and other states' HCFAs, which expressly shield state residents from any requirement to maintain insurance.l1 4 The first assertion turned out to be the key to state standing to challenge the individual mandate. By the time the Eleventh Circuit ruled, the Fourth Circuit had rejected the third ground in Virginia's go-it-alone ACA lawsuit. 115 The second ground ultimately was unavailing because the Eleventh Circuit, although striking down the individual mandate, held it severable from the rest of ACA. involved a public interest law firm and four individuals. The law firm did not claim any injury to itself as an employer, asserting only claims on behalf of its members, two of the individuals. 19 The individuals were U.S. citizens, Michigan residents, and federal taxpayers who claimed that the individual mandate would compel them to purchase health insurance. 120 The individuals declared that the impending requirement to purchase health insurance changed their present spending and saving habits.' 2 ' They further alleged imminent future injury by operation of the January 1, 2014, effective date of the individual mandate. 122 The court deemed suggestions that the individuals could die, leave the country, or become exempt from the individual mandate requirement too speculative to defeat standing.'
23 Moreover, the fact that one of the plaintiffs purchased insurance after filing the lawsuit did not alter the court's decision because ACA requires individuals not only to obtain, but also to maintain, minimum essential coverage.
124
The court concluded: "In view of the probability, indeed virtual certainty, that the minimum coverage provision will apply to the plaintiffs on January 1, 2014, no function of standing law is advanced by requiring plaintiffs to wait until six months or one year before the effective date to file this lawsuit."' 125 Moreover, by permitting the lawsuit to be filed presently, "all three layers of the federal judiciary will be able to reach considered merits decisions, as opposed to rushed interim (e.g., stay) decisions." 126 Having found standing, 127 the court reached the merits of the plaintiffs' challenge and held that the minimum coverage requirement was a valid exercise of the federal commerce power. 30 The district court dismissed three of the plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed claims by three others to go forward. 131 The first two dismissed plaintiffs' asserted standing in their status as lawmakers and based on their policy objections to the federal law. Kathy Byron, a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, voted for Virginia's HCFA, and Jeff Helgeson, a Lynchburg, Virginia, city council member, believed that ACA would have a negative impact on the city. Neither alleged personal injury by operation of the individual mandate or current lack of health insurance. 133 The court held their asserted grounds for standing unavailing. 1 34 The court also dismissed Dr. David Stein, who asserted standing based on speculation that the ACA's regulations would adversely impact his Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates and his liberty interests in practicing his profession and providing care to his patients.' 35 The court found those pleadings too vague and conclusory to support standing.
136
The case also involved two other individuals and a non-profit corporation, Liberty University. The individuals, Michele Waddell and Joanne Merrill, alleged that the individual mandate, at the present time, required them to make changes to their personal finances and lifestyles to comply with the new law. 17 Liberty University, which employed 3900 full-time employees, challenged the ACA's requirement that employers of fifty or more full-time employees offer minimum essential health insurance to their employees or face civil penalties. 138 Liberty University alleged that it would "incur 'significant and costly changes' in its daily business operations well before 2014" to provide the required coverage.' 39 The court held the allegations of these three plaintiffs sufficient to support standing. 40 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed only the latter three plaintiffs' claims and did not review the standing question.
14 ' Rather than dismissing the individuals and Liberty University for lack of standing, the court held that all claims were barred as pre-enforcement actions seeking to enjoin the ACA's individual mandate and employer penalty provisions. 142 According to the court, the challenged provisions constituted "taxes" for purposes of the Federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA) and, therefore, were jurisdictionally barred. Seven-Sky v. Holder involved four U.S. citizens and federal taxpayers seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the individual mandate's enforcement. 146 As in other cases, the individuals asserted imminent future injury based on the penalty that they would be required to pay, beginning in 2014, for failing to obtain minimum essential coverage. 47 They also alleged present actual injury by having to rearrange their finances to prepare for the mandate's 2014 effective date. 48 One of the individuals, Mary Mead, would have been eligible for Medicare by the time the individual mandate took effect, but nonetheless asserted that she would refuse to enroll when she became eligible. 149 Even setting Mead aside, the remaining plaintiffs, absent some change in life circumstances, would be subject to the penalty in 2014.15° Like the Sixth Circuit in Thomas More, the D.C. District Court did not insist on "absolute certainty" that the individuals would be penalized for failing to have insurance in 2014.' 5 1 The substantial probability that they would be adversely affected sufficed. 152 Moreover, their present-day conduct to prepare for the future mandate sufficed for injury-in-fact. 153 The plaintiffs alleged that the pending individual mandate required them to forgo spending discretionary income, donating to charity, paying down debt, and saving for their children's college education. The appellate court considered at some length, and Judge Kavanaugh wrote an even longer dissent on, 157 the application of the Federal TAIA to bar a pre-enforcement challenge to the minimum essential coverage requirement. 158 The court ultimately 149 Id. '50 Id. at 24 (agreeing with Judge Vinson that speculative changed circumstances before or in 2014 did not defeat standing). Plaintiffs Barbara Goudy-Bachman and Gregory Bachman, a married couple with two children, challenged the individual mandate in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. They alleged injury-in-fact on the basis that they were self-employed, did not carry health insurance, did not qualify for Medicaid, and would not qualify for Medicare by January 1, 2014. They also were not members of any groups exempt from compliance with the individual mandate.' 6 ' The plaintiffs dropped their own health insurance in 2001 when the premiums exceeded their mortgage payments and since then have paid for their healthcare costs out-of-pocket. 162 They further averred that they did not purchase a new car, which they otherwise could afford, because they would be unable to afford the payments in 2014 when the individual mandate took effect.1 63 Comparing the Bachmans' averments to plaintiffs' averments in other ACA litigation, the district court held that the Bachmans alleged sufficient economic injury to support standing. 164 The economic impact was immediate in having to forgo the vehicle purchase and undertake financial planning and budget decisions in anticipation of 2014. 165 Accordingly, the Bachmans alleged the constitutional minimum for standing. 166 On the merits, the district court concluded that the individual mandate exceeded congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. 167
B. CASES DENYING STANDING 168
Almost twice as many lower court ACA decisions denied standing as recognized standing. The cases denying standing were brought by a state, state officials, employers, physicians, individuals, patients, and associations. The one case involving a state challenged only the individual mandate and was dismissed on the grounds that the state alleged injury to its citizens' rights, not its own sovereign interests. Most of the individual plaintiffs' claims were dismissed for failing to allege sufficient injury-in-fact. One group of plaintiffs was allowed to amend their pleadings, thereafter reciting the necessary allegations. State officials fared no better than individuals, even when asserting state interests, because they again failed to allege personal, concrete injury. Employers, including one state, failed to allege how ACA was applicable to them. 94 The court rejected plaintiff Baldwin's asserted standing to raise a generalized grievance about government, "claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws.'
195 Baldwin failed to aver that he currently lacked qualifying health insurance, would not have it in 2014, or had to save money now to purchase it in 2014.196 According to the Ninth Circuit, Baldwin's suggestion that he had to take investigatory steps to determine whether he would be in compliance with the law did not establish a particularized injury distinct from everyone else to whom the ACA applies.
197
The Institute lacked standing as either an employer or association representing individuals.
198 As a putative plaintiff challenging the ACA's employer penalty, the Institute failed to allege that it had more than fifty employees, which is required for the penalty to apply.' 99 As an association representing individuals challenging the individual mandate, the Institute lacked standing because the individuals lacked standing. Roe asserted merely that he was a patient who paid for his own medical care. He did not allege facts demonstrating that he would be subject to the individual mandate or that the mandate, if applicable, would change his current choice to pay for his medical care out of pocket.
2 0 4 Dr. Criscito's allegation that he was a physician who treated patients, some of whom were self-pay, was similarly insufficient for failing to allege that he was suffering or would suffer imminent, concrete injury.
2 0 5 The Third Circuit held that Dr. Criscito's further allegation that the ACA would impact his medical practice and the manner in which he sought payment and treated patients was also conjectural. 20 6 The New Jersey Physician's associational standing failed Another case testing standing to challenge the individual mandate involved private individuals residing in Mississippi and Mississippi's Lieutenant Governor Phil Bryant.
2 5 The private plaintiffs asserted standing based on the threatened injury of being forced to purchase health insurance and manage their finances in preparation for complying with the mandate. 2 1 6 Lieutenant Governor Bryant asserted standing as a state employee, first, because the mandate would compel the state to offer employee insurance plans complying with the ACA's requirements, and, second, because he would be unable to drop his own state employee health plan without incurring the tax penalty. 2 1 7 The plaintiffs' asserted commerce power, taxing power, takings, substantive due process, and Tenth Amendment challenges to the individual mandate.
218
The Southern District of Mississippi held that the ten private individual plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege that they would even be subject to the individual mandate, as opposed to exempt on various grounds, and, even if subject, that they would incur the tax penalty for non-compliance.
1 9 With respect to Lieutenant Governor Bryant, the court held that he failed to allege facts to show "certainly impending" injury or that he would be subject to the tax penalty.°2 The ten individual plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint to allege particularized, present-day injuries. All alleged that they were forgoing certain spending to save money to pay the ACA penalties and had made "significant and costly changes" to their lifestyles and personal finances to prepare for "the individual mandate's looming enforcement in 2014.
" ,222 In a subsequent opinion, the court deemed those amended allegations sufficient to support standing. 223 The district court revisited Bryant's standing to assert Mississippi's sovereign interest after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bond, 224 noting the Court's holding that an individual challenging a federal statute "on the basis that it interferes with state sovereignty seeks vindication of his own constitutional ,225
interests-not just those of the state." Bond expressly recognized that federalism protects not only state sovereignty but also enhances individual freedom by diffusing power vertically between the federal government and separate states. 226 Accordingly, laws that upset the constitutional structure also may give rise to individual injury.
227
On the facts, however, the Mississippi court again concluded that Bryant failed to allege imminent, concrete harm inasmuch as the individual mandate was not yet in effect. Moreover, it was not certain that he would still be a state employee when it 228 became effective.
In sum, Bond's recognition of a private plaintiffs Tenth Amendment claim still required injury-in-fact to be justiciable. Moreover, he did not assert that he would be "injured," but merely "affected," by the requirement to offer health insurance to state employees.
2 43 The other individual plaintiffs claimed injury because the employer health plan requirement would increase costs to Missouri taxpayers. 244 The court deemed that assertion too speculative and again contrary to the cited language in Hacker.
45
The plaintiffs' various challenges to the individual mandate also failed to satisfy the constitutional minimum for standing because the plaintiffs did not allege any injury. 246 For example, the twenty-one-year-old plaintiff incorrectly asserted that she would be subject to the penalty because she desired to purchase only catastrophic health insurance. 247 ACA, however, expressly provides that very option for individuals under the age of thirty. 248 The court deemed other assertions too speculative as plaintiffs failed to allege that they, in fact, would not purchase health insurance in 2014, only that they would be subject to the ACA's penalty if they did not. 249 In a would-be class action, Anthony Shreeve and a group of 25,000 other individuals and entities sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging "direct and immediate" violations of their constitutional rights.
2 56 Specifically, they asserted that the defendants, Barak Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, and the United States, exceeded the scope of their constitutional authority, violated the Tenth Amendment, and breached their oaths of office to protect and defend the Constitution. The plaintiffs did not claim any injury by operation of the individual mandate, such as that they would be compelled to purchase health insurance, or required to rearrange their financial affairs or prepare presently for the individual 257 mandate's future effective date. Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to show any concrete injury or personal stake in the controversy. Their claims were squarely within the prohibition on generalized grievances about government, "claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and The case involved a lone pro se plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of the ACA. . 251 Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *7. 252 id. 253 Id. at *7-8. 254 Id. at *8-10. commerce and spending powers. 276 Lower courts readily exercised jurisdiction over those claims as long as the private plaintiffs alleged concrete, particularized harm in having to prepare for the future effective date of the ACA's requirements. States' interests in challenging the alleged expansion of federal power is arguably even more direct than individuals' interest in safeguarding individual rights through the conduit of structural limits on federal power. 77 Yet lower courts were reluctant to recognize state standing to challenge the individual mandate on the same structural grounds.
Individual, employer, and association challenges to ACA are postured as defenses to potential government enforcement actions. Those plaintiffs allege that the federal law itself is unconstitutional and therefore cannot be applied against them. For the most part, lower courts generously accepted individual plaintiffs' alleged injuries based on present-day financial impact or change in position in anticipation of the individual mandate's future effective date. The courts rejected as too speculative the government defendants' suggestions that the plaintiffs might avoid the mandate by death, emigration, employment, or exemption. 278 Injury resulting from the individual mandate is easy to allege; any prudent manager of family or business finances can point to some forgone purchase or change in savings habits in anticipation of future expenses. 279 Indeed, a group of plaintiffs who were initially dismissed for lack of standing were allowed to amend their pleadings. They filed identical amended complaints, which salvaged their case:
In Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition, they alleged that they are 29 0 Even though a state employer may have an interest in that provision, the official failed to allege that he was "injured," as opposed to merely "affected," by the requirement or that he would still be in office as a state employer in 2014.29 ' Accordingly, the claim was dismissed for failing to allege concrete, particularized injury.
With respect to sovereign interest standing, Virginia and other states asserted their interest in enforcing state HCFAs. Two district courts agreed that the existence of a validly enacted state law triggered the states' attorney generals' "duty ... to defend the law and the associated sovereign power to enact it." '292 In one case, that reasoning was squarely rejected on appeal. 293 97 Nevertheless, states could plausibly assert standing to challenge the individual mandate related to their clear standing to challenge Medicaid expansion. Quite conceivably, enforcement of the individual mandate and availability of health insurance subsidies through state exchanges will spur more citizens to apply for coverage. 298 Those incentives, combined with the ACA's broader Medicaid eligibility rules, will likely result in many more applicants qualifying for Medicaid than before ACA. 299 As a result, states' burden of covering both previously and newly eligible beneficiaries will be greater than under Medicaid expansion alone. 300 The Eleventh Circuit did not squarely decide the Medicaid bootstrap argument because the individual and association plaintiffs otherwise had standing to challenge the individual mandate. As to the third category of state standing, Virginia expressly disavowed reliance on quasi-sovereign-interest standing, 302 although a plausible argument could be made on that basis as well. Supreme Court precedent on quasi-sovereign interest standing is scant, but the Court has recognized states' judicially cognizable interest in the health and well-being of their inhabitants when the alleged risk otherwise is too broad and vague to meet the requirements of individual standing.
3 3 The ACA individual mandate arguably does not present a broad, vague risk of harm, akin to greenhouse gas emissions, 30 4 or full and equal participation in a federal statutory scheme. 305 Indeed, the very ease with which individual ACA plaintiffs alleged 296 Compare, for example, "trigger laws" that ban abortion within state borders and purport to take effect as soon as federal law permits. 307 But the decision does not rely solely on quasi-sovereign interests. Massachusetts also asserted a proprietary interest as a landowner in protecting its ocean shores from rising sea levels due to global warming.
3 0 8 Although drawing on parens patriae and quasi-sovereign interest case-law, 3°9 the Court concluded: "That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affected' only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power., 31 0 The nuances of Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency's holding are not necessary to recognize state standing in the ACA litigation. The Court's "special solicitude" 31 1 to state interests in challenging federal laws should at least encompass standing parity, if not a "special pass into court,, 312 to states. As long as states allege concrete, particularized injury to their own interests as a result of the individual mandate they should be allowed access to federal courts.
The most straightforward analysis of state standing in the ACA litigation is to apply the well-established injury-in-fact requirement, the constitutional minimum that all plaintiffs must meet. Even under quasi-sovereign interest standing, states still must show real interest of their own in the litigation, 31 3 which the ACA plaintiffstates did not.
31 4 But I contend that they could have. The Virginia District Court, in rejecting a ripeness challenge to the Commonwealth's claim, acknowledged that the individual mandate does not take effect until 2014, but "that does not mean that its effects will not be felt by the Commonwealth in the near future. 315 Judge Hudson further observed that individuals, insurance companies, and employers have to take steps to ensure that their current health plans comply with ACA or evaluate and contract for insurance coverage in the near future. 316 More to the point of state standing, and "[m]ore importantly, the Commonwealth must revamp its health care program to ensure compliance with the enactment's provisions, particularly with respect to Medicaid. This process will entail more than simple fine tuning. ' ' 17 Further allegations, along the lines of the Medicaid bootstrap argument, 318 buttressed by description of particular planning efforts and budget compromises that AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LITIGATION states are currently undertaking in anticipation of the 2014 effective date 319 should be sufficient for Article III standing purposes. In overturning Judge Hudson's decision on the Commonwealth's standing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that factors such as "a taxpayer's current possession of health insurance, current or planned future consumption of health care, or related voluntary action" would provide a sufficiently concrete factual context to support standing.
32 But the court did not consider similar future regulation of and present-day planning, saving, and action by the Commonwealth as providing "concrete adverseness" for state standing. 321 The Commonwealth perhaps did not adequately allege, and the Fourth Circuit certainly did not consider, similar future regulation of and present-day planning, saving, and action as providing "concrete adverseness" for state standing. In addition to the woodwork effects of Medicaid, Virginia and other states could have more clearly alleged present-day injury in having to adjust state budgets to prepare to implement Medicaid expansion and other changes compelled by the law, survey state insurance laws for compliance with ACA, and decide whether to cooperate with the federal government in establishing state-based health insurance exchanges to facilitate the individual mandate. The point is that these ACA provisions operate directly on states, requiring present-day fiscal and administrative preparation to effectuate the individual mandate.
With respect to private plaintiffs, lower courts readily recognized their standing to challenge the minimum essential coverage requirement that takes effect in 2014 as long as they alleged some present-day financial impact or change in personal or spending habits in anticipation of that date. States, it seems, could just as easily allege concrete and particularized planning and budgetary impacts deriving from the individual mandate. States have a real stake-arguably an even greater stake than individuals-in resolving questions over the relative scope of federal and state powers. 322 If the constitutional minimum requirements for standing can be trusted to preserve the adversarial process and separation of powers in cases involving private litigants, those limits should likewise suffice for cases involving state litigants. The central issue in the ACA litigation is the constitutionality of the minimum essential coverage requirement, better known as the individual mandate. Both individuals, who will be subject to the requirement and associated sanctions for noncompliance, and states, which play a central role in implementing the individual mandate, challenge its constitutionality. Because individuals cannot assert plausible due process objections to the requirement to purchase health insurance, they instead argue that Congress has exceeded the scope of its enumerated powers by enacting such a law. That issue, regarding the federal structure of government, is particularly and directly salient to states. Lower courts readily recognized private plaintiffs' standing to challenge the individual mandate on structural grounds but were less willing to allow states to bring similar claims. This Article argues for states' standing parity.
